Michigan Law Review
Volume 102

Issue 5

2004

The Journey from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v.
Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity
Harry T. Edwards
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law and
Race Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Harry T. Edwards, The Journey from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial
Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944 (2004).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol102/iss5/5

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE JOURNEY FROM BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION TO GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER:
FROM RACIAL ASSIMILATION TO
DIVERSITY
Harry T. Edwards*
Fifty years ago, in Brown v. Board of Education,1 the Supreme
Court confronted a precise and straightforward question: "Does
segregation of childre'n in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational

opportunities? "2 The Court's answer was precise and straightforward:

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs ...are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.3
I was only 13 years old when the Court rendered its judgment in
Brown on May 17, 1954. I vaguely recall my mother telling me about
Thurgood Marshall having won an important case at the Supreme
Court, and I remember seeing his picture in the newspaper the next
day. But I did not then understand the enormity of the decision. And
it certainly never occurred to me that Brown would precipitate the

*
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. B.S. Cornell 1962, J.D.
Michigan 1965. Judge Edwards was a faculty member at the University of Michigan Law
School from 1970 to 1975 and from 1977 to 1980, and at Harvard Law School from 1975 to
1977, earning tenure at both schools. He was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1980, where he served as Chief Judge from October 1994
until July 2001. During the past twenty-four years, he has continued to teach part-time,
serving as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Michigan, Pennsylvania, Duke, Georgetown,
Harvard, and, most recently, NYU. - Ed.
I would like to acknowledge and offer special thanks to a few people who were
singularly helpful to me in preparing this essay: Julie C. Suk, AB. Harvard 1997, J.D. Yale
2003, D.Phil. Oxford 2004, worked tirelessly with me on the research and drafting of the
essay; Linda Elliott, Special Counsel, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, B.A. Kalamazoo
College 1981, J.D. Michigan 1986, LL.M. Georgetown 1992, offered incredibly astute and
useful suggestions on the early drafts of the essay; and Brent Hayes Edwards, Associate
Professor, Rutgers, AB. Yale 1990, Ph.D. Columbia 1998, provided telling insights on the
history of literary and political discourses of African Americans.

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
3. Id. at 495.
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major changes in race relations that we have seen in the United States
over the past 50 years.
In 1954, racial bigotry was firmly entrenched in our society.
African

Americans

employment,

faced

housing,

blatant

voting

discrimination

rights,

public

in

education,

office,

public

accommodations, and interstate travel. Brown addressed segregation
in public education, but the case was symbolically about so much
more. The decision implicitly endorsed the idea that integration
through racial assimilation would eventually cure racial bigotry.4 And
the Court was firm in concluding that "'[t]he impact [of racial
segregation] is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group. ' "5 This was a powerful statement about
racial inequality in America. The crucial precept underlying the
decision in Brown is simple: the law cannot be used to separate the
races to the detriment of the minority. As the legislatures and courts
have enforced this principle over the past 50 years, African Americans
have gained opportunities and access - in employment, politics,
public and private accommodations, housing, and travel - that were
unheard of in 1954.
The great irony is that, although we have seen many advances in
racial equality over the past 50 years, we have yet to find a cure for the
problem that

precipitated

Brown

-

racial inequality

in public

education. The Court in Brown said that "it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education."6 Yet, in 2004, thousands of African
American students in inner-city schools are impoverished for want of
a decent elementary and secondary education.7 Poverty, racially

4. Although not explicit in the language of the opinion, the most vocal opponents of
segregation during this era drew a link between integration and the end of racial bigotry.
And they conceived of integration as assimilation with the majority. Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s 1963 "I Have a Dream" speech summed up the aspirations of those who fought for
school integration in that era. Dr. King invoked the image of black and white children
holding hands, in a world in which their race would no longer matter. See Martin Luther
King, Jr., I Have A Dream, Address at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom
(Aug. 28, 1963), available at The Martin Luther King, Jr. Papers Project, Stanford
University, http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/speechesFrame.htm.
5. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting a finding of the three-judge district court in the
underlying Kansas case).
6. Id. at 493.
7. See GARY 0RFIELD & CHANGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S
NIGHTMARE? 20-21 (2004) (arguing that poor Black students in segregated schools tend to
be taught by less experienced or unqualified teachers in deteriorated facilities, which lack
key resources and demanding courses); see also Valena W. Plisko, The Release of the
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 2003 Trial Urban District
Assessments of Reading and Mathematics (Dec. 17, 2003) (presenting data showing that
urban standardized test scores are below national averages), available at www.nces.ed.gov/
commissioner/remarks2003/12_17_2003.asp; COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCHOOLS &
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segregated housing patterns, and failed programs to force integration
through busing, as well as inadequate funding, facilities, and teachers,
have left these students without adequate educational opportunities.8
The history of racial inequality in higher education has been
different, however. When I graduated from high school in 1958,
African Americans were largely excluded from schools like Cornell
University, where I attended college, and the University of Michigan,
where I attended law school. There were fewer than a dozen African
Americans at Cornell during the four years when I was there, and I
was the only African American enrolled in the University of Michigan
Law School when I graduated in 1965. The absence of African
Americans was not for want of qualified candidates - we were simply
unwelcome. However, beginning in the latter half of the 1960s, many
colleges, universities, and professional schools adopted "affirmative
action" programs that have gone a long way toward ensuring that
African Americans have equal access to higher education.
In 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger,9 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of affirmative action in higher education. The Court held that
"student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify
the use of race in university admissions"10 and found lawful an
affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law School
designed to ensure "racial and ethnic diversity."11 The Court saw the
pursuit of student body diversity as justified, because it prepares
students for an increasingly diverse work force and society. The
majority also tellingly noted that "it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity."12 Through the ideal of diversity, Grutter
reaffirmed Bro wn's commitment to racial equality.°

THE COLLEGE BOARD, MAKING THE GRADE: A REPORT ON SAT I RESULTS IN THE
NATION'S URBAN SCHOOLS (2001) (presenting data showing that urban SAT I scores are
below the national average); COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCHOOLS & ACT, A DECADE
OF ACT RESULTS IN THE NATION'S URBAN SCHOOLS 1990-1999 (2001) (presenting data
showing that urban ACT scores are below the national average). See generally JONATHAN
KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (chronicling the dismal condition of public schools in
low-income urban and rural areas).
8. See Walter R. Allen & Joseph 0. Jewell, The Miseducation of Black America: Black
Education Since An American Dilemma, in AN AMERICAN DILEMMA REVISITED: RACE
RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 169, 188-89 (Obie Clayton, Jr. ed., 1996).
9. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
10.

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.

11. Id. at 2332 (quoting id. app. at 120).
12. Id. at 2341.
13. In a companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003), the Court held that,
because the University's use of race in its undergraduate admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored to achieve the school's asserted interest in diversity, the policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
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Brown and Grutter are landmarks in the evolution of race relations
in the United States. Each case also dramatically highlights how the
force of law can be an indispensable weapon in the quest for racial
equality. Their holdings are quite different, however. Brown sought to
foster equality through integration by prohibiting forced segregation
on the basis of race; Grutter aims to foster equality by permitting
forced racial integration to achieve diversity. It is noteworthy that,
taken

together,

the

two

decisions

mirror

a

major

societal

phenomenon: over the past 50 years, many African Americans have
abandoned assimilation as a model of integration in favor of today's
ideal of diversity. In other words, many African Americans have
rejected the idea that they should "blend in" with the majority,
choosing instead to value their distinct racial identity.14
In this Essay, I briefly journey from Brown to Grutter. Drawing
upon my own personal and professional experiences, I reflect on racial
equality and inequality in America over the past 50 years, and I
ponder the consequences of the shift from racial assimilation to
diversity as a means of achieving racial equality.
I.

PROGRESS AFfER BROWN AND THE NECESSITY OF

R ACE-C ONSCIOUS ACTIONS
In thinking about the 50 years since Brown, it is important to be
clear about one thing: American society could not have achieved
meaningful progress in race relations without race-conscious actions.1 5
Color-blind remedies could not cure race discrimination i n America. It
would be absurd for anyone to suggest otherwise. Before and shortly
after Brown was decided, African Americans were largely excluded
from the most preeminent universities. We were effectively barred

14. In referring to "racial identity," I am aware that scholars have questioned the use of
race as a conceptual category. See, e.g. , PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING
POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND THE COLOR LINE 1 1-53 (2000). As Anthony Appiah argues,
one can subscribe to a racial identity without believing in the biological notion of race and
without equating race with culture. See generally K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture,
Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR
CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30-105 (1996). In the United States,
African Americans have a racial identity in part resulting from ascription of such an identity
by others and in part resulting from self-identification. A racial identity may encompass a
variety of cultures and perspectives and evolve over time, since its formation is largely
influenced by social, political, and economic circumstances. See MICHAEL OMI & HowARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s, at
52-54, 137-44 (2d ed. 1994). But these complexities do not raise any serious doubt about the
existence of a Black or African-American racial identity.
15. For a personal account of the significance of Brown and race-conscious policies to
the generation of African Americans born around the time when the case was decided, see
CHARLES J. OGLETREE JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF
CENTURY OF BROWN (2004). For an interesting and provocative interpretation of Brown's
connection to the civil rights movement, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
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from all but segregated practices in major professions. We held very
few important political positions. We were denied employment on the
basis of race and paid less for the work we did. We were denied access
to recreational facilities, eating places, housing, hotels, and means of
travel. We were told not to commingle with - much less date or
marry - members of the majority race. We were denied full
participation in major league sports. We were foreclosed from most
roles on television and radio and excluded from mainstream news
media, movies, and theater. We had no meaningful voice in America.
In short, by dint of racial bigotry, African Americans were mostly
insignificant participants in American society.
The "second-class" status of African Americans was attributable,
in no small part, to the legacy of slavery. Slavery significantly fueled
the deeply held belief of many Americans that African Americans
were innately inferior. Even a century after emancipation, that belief
had not been dispelled. Consequently, when Brown was decided, it
was relatively easy for members of the majority to characterize bigotry
against African Americans as judgments based on "merit," rather than
as invidious discrimination on the basis of race. Bigotry was
entrenched and resistant to easy cure.
In plainly and simply insisting on equality for all, Brown set a
standard for Congress, the courts, and the executive branch in their
later quests to ban racial discrimination. In the decade and a half
following Brown, major legislation was enacted to address long
standing problems of race discrimination in employment,16 housing,17
travel,18 and public accommodations and facilities.19 Three principal
goals
prompted
these
legislative
actions:
redress
for
past
discrimination,

equal

opportunity

without

regard

to

race,

and

integration. The latter goal - integration - always has been the most

16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (2000)).
17. Congress prohibited discrimination in housing in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, § 804, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(2000)). In addition, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. , 392 U.S. 409
(1968), that the ban on discrimination in the formation of contracts contained in 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (2000), passed after the Civil War, was a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery.
18. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in public
accommodations, including hotels. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, § 201,
78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000)). The Supreme
Court upheld Title II as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
in Heart ofA tlanta Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
19. In addition to Title II, Congress also passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284, tit. I, § lOl(a), 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000)),
criminalizing the violent interference with a person's use of a public facility because of the
person's race, color, religion, or national origin.
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controversial.2 0 Indeed, the meaning and desirability of integration has
long been the subject of disagreement among African Americans. As
the

political

stakes

have

evolved,

the

debates

among

B lack

intellectuals and political leaders have taken many guises and involved
many notable participants, including Booker T. Washington, W.E.B.
Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, James Weldon Johnson, Walter White, A.
Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ella
Baker, Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, James Farmer, Malcolm X,
Stokely Carmichael, and Angela Davis, to name but a few.21 The
seminal debates between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois
at the start of the twentieth century highlight several of the principal
issues.
During the Jim Crow era, Booker T. Washington called for
investment in vocational

training for Black workers, largely in

separate B lack schools, so that they could become economically self
sufficient. Washington believed that, "in all things that are purely
social we can remain as separate as the fingers," emphasizing that
" [t]he opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is worth
infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar at the opera
house."22 Thus, he did not challenge the separation of the races that
was imposed by law.
During the same period, W.E.B. Du Bois called for integration: he
pressed for civil and political rights and the expansion of access to
higher education for Blacks.23

Du

Bois

famously believed

that

20. For example, some scholars have argued that, contrary to what the Court said in
Brown, Black children in segregated schools did not suffer from a lack of self-esteem. See,
e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 22 (1996). For more complete analyses of the effects of desegregation programs,
see DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1995);
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Christine H. Rossell et al. eds., 2002).
21. Scholars in various disciplines have chronicled and analyzed these debates. See
generally BROOKS, supra note 20; HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO
INTELLECTUAL (1967); JOY JAMES, TRANSCENDING THE TALENTED TENTH: BLACK
LEADERS AND AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS (1997); STEVEN F. LAWSON, CIVIL RIGHTS
CROSSROADS: NATION, COMMUNITY, AND THE B LACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE (2003);
MANNING MARABLE, BLACK LEADERSHIP (1998); WILSON JEREMIAH MOSES, THE
GOLDEN AGE OF BLACK NATIONALISM, 1850-1925 (1978); KEVERN VERNEY, THE ART OF
THE POSSIBLE: BOOKER T. WASHINGTON AND BLACK LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1881-1925 (2001); RAYMOND WOLTERS, Du BOIS AND HIS RIVALS (2002); Randall
Kennedy, Integration: An Interpretation, in 1 MICROSOFT ENCARTA AFRICANA (Kwame
Anthony Appiah & Henry Louis Gates, Jr. eds., CD-ROM, 1999).
22. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY 221-22, 224 (1901). For an account
of the eighteenth and nineteenth century historical contexts that influenced Booker T.
Washington's separatist positions, see SCOTT MALCOLMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD: THE
AMERICAN MISADVENTURE OF RACE 185-219 (2000).
23. W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 89-110 (Modern Library 1996)
(1903). It is interesting to note, in light of the journey from Brown to Grutter, that arguments
about "integration" often revolved around access to higher education. For example, Du
Bois's chapter, "Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others," in The Souls of Black Folk,
focuses on the importance of university education. See id. at 43-61 .
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educated Blacks, the "talented tenth" of the race, were responsible for
improving the condition of the entire race.24 However, several decades
later, when the political landscape had begun to shift in favor of
integration, Du Bois expressed doubts about the power of integration
alone to bring about true racial equality. He worried that the
integration of educated Blacks into white society was creating not a
responsible vanguard, dedicated to improving the plight of the mass of
African Americans, but instead a self-interested class with no concern
for racial justice.25 Du Bois began increasingly to sense that "any
planning for the benefit of American Negroes on the part of a Negro
intelligentsia" would have to involve deliberate attention to the
interests of the race as a group, through what he termed "organized
and deliberate self-segregation."26 He called on African Americans to
build up and invest in the autonomous financial, educational, and
cultural institutions within Black communities.27 Nonetheless, for
much of his career, Du Bois saw integration as the ultimate object of
self-segregation: separatism, in his view, was a strategy that would
enable "co-operation and incorporation into the white group on the
best possible terms. "28

24. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Talented Tenth, in W.E.B. Du BOIS: WRmNGS 842, 842
(Nathan Huggins ed., The Library of America 1986) (1903).
25. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Talented Tenth: Memorial Address, 15 BOULE J. 3-13 (1948),
reprinted in W.E.B. Du BOIS: A READER 347, 349 (David Levering Lewis ed., 1995) ( [M )y
plan of training a talented tenth might put in control and power, a group of selfish, self
indulgent, well-to-do-men . . . without any real care, or certainly no arousing care, as to what
became of the mass of American Negroes, or of the mass of any people.").
"

26. W.E.B. Du Bois, A Negro Nation Within a Nation, 42 CURRENT HIST. 265-70 (1935)
[hereinafter Du Bois, A Negro Nation Within a Nation], reprinted in W.E.B. DU BOIS: A
READER, supra note 25, at 563, 569. Recognizing the shifting political context, Du Bois
noted, "Those of us who in that day opposed Booker Washington's plans did not foresee
exactly the kind of change that was coming . . . . " Id. at 565. See generally DAVID LEVERING
LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY, 19191963, at 302-48 (describing Du Bois's break with the NAACP).
27. Du Bois, A Negro Nation Within a Nation, supra note 26, at 569.
28. W.E.B. DU BOIS, DUSK OF DAWN: AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A
RACE CONCEPT (1940), reprinted in W.E.B. DU BOIS: WRITINGS, supra note 24, at 549,
700. In truth, because he was a brilliant and complex man, it is difficult to characterize Du
Bois's views:
Always a controversial figure, he espoused racial and political beliefs of such variety and
seeming contradiction as to bewilder and alienate as many Americans, black and white, as he
inspired or converted. Beneath the shifting complexity of alliances and denunciations,
nevertheless, there was a pattern, a congealing of inclinations, experiences, and ideas, more
and more inclining

Du Bois to a vision of society that became, in contrast to the lives of most

men and women, increasingly radical as he grew older, until the day came wheri the civil
liberties maverick was supplanted by the full-blown Marxist.

David Levering Lewis, Introduction to W.E.B. DU BOIS: A READER, supra note 25, at 1, 2
(David Levering Lewis ed., 1995).
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Suffice it to say that the views of African Americans regarding the
shape and effects of integration are complicated, involving shifting and
sometimes

overlapping

positions.

Generalizations

are,

therefore,

hazardous. Nevertheless, I believe that some insights can be gleaned
from my sense of the landscape over the past 50 years. When I was
growing up, my clear impression was that integration was a crucial
component of racial equality, and the aim of integration included
much more than mere equal opportunity. I had the sense that many
African Americans optimistically accepted the idea that integration
would bring them into the "melting pot" in which all members of
society blend into a single whole, and that this would eventually
cure racial bigotry against Blacks. In other words, I was taught that,
with integration, we would eventually "blend in" with the majority
race.29 Integration in these terms meant that most neighborhoods and
schools would be visibly multiracial and

all races would enjoy

substantially equal prestige and incomes. Thurgood Marshall and Dr.
Martin Luther King were our champions in pursuit of this
assimilationist ideal.30
The melting-pot metaphor preceded Brown, first appearing in a
1908 play by Israel Zangwill depicting the assimilation of Jewish
immigrants into American life.31 The melting pot was a crucible in
which the cultures of various immigrant groups would blend with the
dominant Anglo-American culture. Recent studies by historians show
that, from the late nineteenth century to the present, most immigrant
groups have been able to accede to the status of "whiteness" even
when those groups were, upon arrival in America, met with fierce
prejudice, including bias drawing on the rhetoric of racial difference.32
Perhaps encouraged by the progress of other groups, and by the
Brown decision, many African Americans carried the hope that, once
we "blended in," we would no longer be seen as "Negroes," but,
rather, merely as "Americans. " But the nature of bigotry against
African Americans was qualitatively different from bias faced by other

29. It has been argued that one of the solutions to "the race problem" is biological race
mixing or amalgamation - i.e., the figurative "browning" of America, a gradual process
whereby "we" would become so mixed that prejudice would become nonsensical or
impractical. See Kennedy, supra note 21. This is not what I mean by "blending in."
30. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous "I Have a Dream" speech characterized
integration as a version of the American Dream. He imagined a world in which his children
would be judged by "the content of their character" rather than the "color of their skin."
King, supra note 4.
31. ISRAEL ZANGWILL, THE MELTING-POT 184-85 (1909).
32 See, e.g. , NOEL IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); MATTHEW
JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998); DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 133-63 (1991).
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groups, even other racial minorities.33 The hope of "blending in,"
rather than integrating with others on our own terms, was a bit
fanciful. And it had some perverse effects. Thus, for example, some
African Americans turned against members of their own race who
were "too" dark or whose hair was "too" nappy, because their visible
differences made it all the more difficult for African Americans to
"blend in."34 The simple truth is that the assimilationist model of
integration never has worked on any large scale in America. African
Americans always have been seen to be "different,"35 even as we have
earned rights in society. Indeed, even Blacks who came to this country
as immigrants have had great difficulty joining the melting pot.36
In 1954, the entrenched racial bigotry against African Americans
made any form of integration difficult. As a consequence, the
transformative power of Brown was limited. That decision could not
alone, without further initiatives and interventions, cure the epidemic
of racial bigotry. As a result, race-conscious actions were adopted by
the federal government to undo the legacy of pervasive racial
discrimination.
B efore any such programs were instituted, President Kennedy
used the phrase "affirmative action" to refer to equal opportunity
measures

that

would

go

beyond

the

mere

prohibition

of

discrimination. A 1961 executive order issued by the President stated
that " it [was] the policy of the executive branch of the Government to
encourage by positive measures equal opportunity for all qualified
persons within the Government."37 In establishing the obligations of
Government
announced,

contractors
"The

and

contractor

will

subcontractors,
not

the

discriminate

President

against

any

employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color,
or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated
during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or

33. One need only revisit Gunnar Myrdal's seminal study on "the Negro problem" to be
reminded of this point. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). "The treatment of the Negro is America's
greatest and most conspicuous scandal." Id. at 1020.
34. Toni Morrison explores the perverse psychological effects of this dynamic in her
novel, The Bluest Eye. See TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (1970).
35. See generally NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now 96-121
(1997).
36. Harvard sociologist Mary Waters has documented the ways in which Black West
Indian immigrants successfully integrate economically into American society when they first
arrive (initially following the same pattern as other immigrant groups), only to find that,
over time, the realities of American race relations begin to interfere with their success. See
MARY C. WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND
AMERICAN REALITIES 7-8 (1999).
37. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977, 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).
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national origin."38 The Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
created by this order was an enforcement agency entrusted with the
power to cancel contracts and debar contractors who were not in
compliance with the nondiscrimination policy.
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President
Johnson used the term "affirmative action" in Executive Order 1 1,246
on Equal Employment Opportunity,39 which explicitly called for the
head of each executive department and agency to " establish and
maintain a positive program of equal employment opportunity for all
civilian employees."40 The order also required federal contractors to
take affirmative steps to recruit, hire, and promote more minorities.41
In a commencement address at Howard University shortly before the
executive order was issued, the President explained why he felt that
strong measures were necessary to eradicate the effects of past racial
discrimination:

You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are free
to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose the leaders you
please.
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "you
are free to compete with all the others," and still justly believe that you
have been completely fair.
Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our
citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.
This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for civil rights.
We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equity
but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as
a fact and equality as a result.42
Affirmative action, as envisioned by Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, went beyond the mere ban on racial discrimination - it
included positive measures to achieve true equal opportunity.43 The
executive orders of Kennedy and Johnson explicitly linked such
positive measures to the past denial of equal opportunities and the

38. Id.
39. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,320 (Sept. 24, 1965).
40. Id. at 12,319.
41. Id. at 12,320.
42. Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Commencement Address at Howard
University (June 4, 1965), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/
speeches.hom/650604.asp.
43. One legal scholar suggests that modern affirmative action may be rooted in race
conscious legislation aimed at helping Blacks reach equality in the Reconstruction era. See
James E. Jones, Jr., The Origins of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 388-92
(1988).

Michigan Law Review

954

(Vol. 102:944

need to redress past discrimination, not to abstract values such as
diversity.
The 1960s also saw universities begin to change their stance on
racial equality in higher education. Educators finally recognized that
the near-total exclusion of historically disfavored minorities from
preeminent undergraduate, graduate, and professional school
programs would be prolonged indefinitely in the absence of race
conscious solutions.44 When I graduated from law school in 1965, less
than 1% of all law students in America were Black, and over one third
of Black law students were enrolled in all-Black schools.45 Less than
2% of all medical students in America were Black, and three fourths
of them were enrolled at two all-Black institutions, Howard University
and Meharry Medical College.46
In 1965, Dean Erwin Griswold was reportedly concerned over the
absence of African-American students at the Harvard Law School.47
He sought to remedy this situation by launching a special summer
program at historically B lack colleges to interest African-American
students in attending law school.48 The following year, Harvard Law
School

employed

an

affirmative

action program to

ensure

the

admission of African Americans.49
Other

law schools,

including Michigan,50 followed suit.

And

graduate and professional schools across the country began to take
race into account in their admissions decisions, accepting qualified
Black students even when they had test scores or grades that were
lower than those of other admittees.51 These policies were responsible
for opening doors that had historically been closed to African
Americans. Between 1967 and 1975, the percentage of Black law
students climbed from less than 1 % to 4.5%.52 The percentage of
Black medical students climbed from less than 2% to 6.3%.53 It is clear
that the prod of affirmative action was essential to breaking the

44. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (No. 76-81 1), available at 1977 WL 189744, at *13.
45. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 5
(1998).
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River
Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395, 397 (2000).
51. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 45, at 7.
52. Id. at 5, 7.
53. Id.
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pattern of excluding African Americans from preeminent law schools
and medical schools and the choice opportunities that come with
graduation from these educational institutions.
We cannot make sense of the past 50 years without understanding
that, when Brown was decided, the situation was such that no
significant gains in racial equality were possible save through
conscious institutional efforts to promote racial minorities. And these
institutional efforts came only in the wake of specific redress ordered
by the courts with "do-it-now" mandates, legislation by Congress, and
official acts of the executive branch. These legal mandates and
institutional efforts were indispensable prods to progress. It would be
fanciful to think otherwise.
Some people have opposed race-conscious remedies in the belief
that the beneficiaries of such actions often gain positions that they
have not earned and for which they are not qualified. This is a
disingenuous view of American history. What history shows is that
race-conscious remedies were invoked after Brown only when it
became clear that color-blind actions would not effectively eradicate
the patterns of racial bigotry in America. History also shows that,
because of these race-conscious actions, countless African Americans
have succeeded with great distinction in educational and employment
situations that were formerly denied to Blacks.
II.

R ACE-C ONSCIOUS ACTIONS AND MERIT: SOME
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INSIGHTS

When I entered the University of Michigan Law School in 1962, I
was the only African American in my class.54 At the time, before race
conscious remedies were employed, the few "Negroes" who succeeded
in the majority world were seen as "different." We were seen as
having made it despite our race. In other words, an African American
who succeeded on merit was considered an exception, to whom the
stereotype of inferiority did not apply. Even before affirmative action
existed, merit was thought of as something that a typical Black person
did not possess.
I graduated very high in my law school class, earning honors for
academic achievement: Order of the Coif, Law Review, best-in-the
class awards, and a scholarship. Nevertheless, when I finished law
school, I was rejected by numerous major law firms to which I applied.
I interviewed with large firms in Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Washington, D.C., but I was told quite frankly by some
of the partners that, despite my impressive record, the firm would not

54. I discuss some of these experiences in more detail in Harry T. Edwards, Personal
Reflections on Thirty Years of Legal Education for Minority Students, 37 MICH. L.
QUADRANGLE NOTES 38 (1994) [hereinafter Edwards, Personal Reflections].
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hire a Negro. In other words, despite my qualifications on the law
firms' own measures of merit, I was rejected because of my race. It was
only when my white mentor, a Michigan law professor, pressed on my
behalf that I received a j ob offer from a maj or Chicago law firm.
In 1969 and 1970, students at the University of Michigan engaged
in protests and demanded that the law school hire a B lack faculty
member. It was because of these protests that I was recruited to teach
at Michigan in 1970. In 1975, I was invited to join the faculty at
Harvard Law School under similar circumstances. In 1977, I was
appointed to the Board of Directors of Amtrak, where I later was
elected Chairman, because President Carter was determined to give
qualified African Americans access to high government positions. And
in 1980, I was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C.

Circuit,

in

part,

because

the

Carter

administration

was

determined to put more qualified African Americans on the bench.
If

these

institutions

had

not

undertaken

race-conscious

interventions, I probably would not have achieved any of these
professional
Americans

advances.
traditionally

These
had

were

j obs

been

excluded.

from

which
Even

African
with

my

qualifications, these employment opportunities only became available
to me as a result of efforts that quite purposefully diverged from the
way things had been done for a long time. And merit never has been
an issue. By all objective measures of achievement, I have excelled at
every stage of my career, as have countless African Americans of my
generation.
Yet, merit has come to be characterized by some as a value that is
compromised by race-conscious actions.55 And some critics argue that
race-conscious actions generate racial stigmas, which in turn instill a
sense of inferiority in African Americans who are the beneficiaries of
racial preferences.56 I have always found these claims to be specious.
In my situation, for example, in the normal course of events, I
would have been excluded from significant positions in society, despite
my qualifications, because of my race. Therefore, it never crossed my
mind to feel concern over accepting any of these positions when they
became available. The fact that race may have played a part in the
thinking of some of the persons who extended me offers was of no
interest to me. So long as I was offered the positions on the same
terms as similarly situated white candidates, I did not hesitate to take
them. I wanted the same opportunities as my white colleagues, and I
certainly was not going to pass up good positions because race may

55. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 177 (1994) (arguing that minority
student beneficiaries of affirmative action are "mismatched" with competitive schools).
56. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF
RACE IN AMERICA 1 16 (1990) ("[O]ne of the most troubling effects of racial preferences for
blacks is a kind of demoralization, or put another way, an enlargement of self-doubt.").
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have been a factor in the decisions to hire me. This would have
allowed institutions that had denied African Americans opportunities
in the past to continue those exclusionary practices in the future. And
once I accepted a position, I worked with no thought other than to
succeed. I refused to be "distracted by petty people and petty issues."57
I knew my capabilities. And I was confident that, once the door of
opportunity was opened, I would succeed. I was never impeded by "a
sense of inferiority. "
I have some well-meaning friends and colleagues who worry that I
will demean my achievements if I acknowledge that I may have been
given some opportunities because of my race. Their concerns, albeit
born of kindness and loyalty, are naive. Race-conscious actions gave
me opportunities that I otherwise would have been denied because of
my race. My achievements could not have come without these
opportunities.
Race-conscious remedies are only mischievous when they are
employed mischievously. In the early days of affirmative action in
higher education, for example, I saw many situations in which persons
assigned to implement affirmative action did so with paternalistic
motives and an air of condescension. They sometimes even recruited
African-American

candidates

with

questionable

credentials,

determined to prove that there were no qualified Blacks. In such
circumstances, I have no doubt that some B lacks struggled with a
"sense of inferiority" and some suffered for lack of any real support.
These poorly conceived affirmative

action programs and hostile

environments also led some people to conclude that African
Americans were routinely being given positions that they had not
earned and for which they were not qualified. Unsurprisingly, given
the entrenched history of racial bigotry in America, these exaggerated
negative perceptions overwhelmed reality and, eventually, affirmative
action came to be seen by many as invidious discrimination against
whites who were allegedly better qualified.58
These resentful attitudes toward affirmative action, unfortunately,
exacerbated the very racial hostilities that the programs were intended
to cure. The net result was that African Americans who were the
beneficiaries of affirmative action sometimes were labeled unqualified
and unworthy.59 Such conclusions often reeked of the worst days of
racial bigotry and failed to recognize that race-conscious actions were
absolutely essential to negate some of the worst effects of racism.

57. Edwards, supra note 54, at 43.
58. See generally Harry T. Edwards & Barry L. Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1975).
59. For a discussion of this phenomenon from an autobiographical perspective, see
STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 22-23 (1991).
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While some may fault affirmative action for casting a cloud over the
accomplishments of African Americans, I view that cloud

as a

remnant of the pathology that has long conflated racial bigotry with
judgments about merit. And that pathology certainly did not (and
does not now) justify abandoning affirmative action.
Fortunately, some of the problems seen in the early days of
affirmative action found cures. There are now many people of high
standing and good faith who are fully committed to racially integrated
environments in both higher education and employment. In the recent
past, their efforts have resulted in the adoption of high-quality
affirmative action programs, which have been designed to select,
support, and graduate or promote qualified African Americans. And
lest anyone doubt the importance and success of quality affirmative
action programs, one need only read the many amicus briefs - filed
by

universities,

professional

schools,

educational

associations,

corporations, military officials, bar associations, student organizations,
civil rights groups, and public officials - in support of the University
of Michigan in the Grutter litigation.60 Some very smart and highly
committed people at Michigan and other institutions were determined
to fight the charges of "reverse discrimination" and prove the great
worth of affirmative action. They succeeded.

"
III. "VALUING-OUR-IDENTITIES
Perhaps in response to the many failed efforts to integrate public
schools

in the

inner cities

and,

also,

the

countless

(and often

frustrating) legal and political battles over affirmative action, a major
social
phenomenon developed in the post-Brown era: the
assimilationist model of integration lost favor with many African
Americans. Most B lacks unhesitatingly embrace Brown's rejection of
separate-but-equal. And many Blacks, at least those not trapped in the
underclass of society,61 accept the initiatives inspired by Brown and
enjoy the fruits of racial equality in higher education, employment,
housing, recreation, travel, and politics. African Americans have no

60. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340, where the Court wrote:
The Law School's claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its amici, who
point to the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity. In addition to
the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show
that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and "better prepares students
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals."
Id. (citations omitted).
61. By "underclass," I refer to the class of people whose lives are characterized by
persistent poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, violence, and despair. See Christopher Jencks, Is
the American Underclass Growing?, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 28, 28-30 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
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desire to turn away from the just results of equality. But, by the same
token, many Blacks no longer seek integration through assimilation.
What we may be witnessing at the start of the twenty-first century
is an acceptance by many African Americans of what I view as a
"valuing-our-identities" approach that is radically different from the
"blending in," assimilationist ideal with which I grew up. Our society
has become a conglomeration of differences. We now look to gender,
age, race, ethnicity, and religious differences - often with pride - to
distinguish ourselves. Attempting to downplay these distinctive
characteristics is often frowned upon, rather than encouraged, by
one's peers. African Americans have learned that it is possible to
blunt negative stereotypes that derive from characteristics that make
them different by boldly parading those characteristics. What was
formerly viewed

as negative

emerged

the

during

same

becomes

historical

positive. This trend first

period

that gave

birth

to

affirmative action. The late 1960s saw the popularity of slogans such as
"Black

is

deliberately

beautiful,"
attempted

and

"I'm

Black

and

I'm

proud,"

which

to transform Blackness from a historical

emblem of social inferiority to a source of pride and cultural value.
The popularity of the Afro hairstyle was one of a number of popular
and powerful symbols of the critical stance toward past preoccupations
with "blending in."
Today,

African

Americans,

both

young

and

old,

embrace

characteristics and cultural heritages that distinguish them from other
groups. And even though they would not accept a societal mandate
forcing racial separation, there are African Americans who elect to
live apart from white society, especially in social realms. When given a
choice, some African Americans choose proximity to other African
Americans. Black churches remain popular among African-American
Christians. Some upper-middle-class African Americans choose to buy
homes in neighborhoods known to be populated by other African
Americans - the Atlanta, Georgia suburbs, for example62 - or to
vacation with other African-American families - say, on Martha's
Vineyard in Massachusetts.63 In other words, there is something
unique and comforting about being with members of your own race
that draws some African Americans together.
At various universities, some African-American undergraduates,
when given a choice, elect to live with other Black students. 64 I worry

62. The gravitation of affluent African·American professionals toward certain suburbs
in DeKalb County, Atlanta, is discussed in HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., AMERICA BEHIND
THE COLOR LINE: DIALOGUES WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 199-206 (2004).
63. Acclaimed Black filmmaker Stanley Nelson's recent documentary, A Place of Our
Own, chronicles Oak Bluffs, a Black summer resort community on Martha's Vineyard. A
PLACE OF OUR OWN (Firelight Media 2004).
64. At Harvard, for example, an informal study showed that many Black
undergraduates elected to live in three dorms that were geographically distant from the rest
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about the implications of this when students cut themselves off from
opportunities that would better ensure a full and rich educational
experience. These self-selection tendencies remain a reality, however.
Indeed, Black students who attend historically B lack colleges and
universities, such as Morehouse, Howard, and Spelman, often choose
these schools when they have the option of attending other
competitive colleges and universities.
The attitude that underscores this valuing-our-identities approach
was aptly summed up by an African-American professional who
explained her move to a predominantly Black Atlanta suburb: "We
are not forced into segregated areas. At the same time, we can choose
to live in predominantly African-American areas without sacrificing
lifestyle, education, or traditional values."65
Although these examples suggest a separatist strain, the valuing
our-identities

approach

also

embraces

racial

integration.

Many

African Americans who choose to integrate themselves in majority
white or mixed-race communities also value their distinct identities.
Integration and assimilation are no longer synonymous. In the past,
integration meant "blending in" with the white majority. It meant, for
example, straightening one's hair and avoiding preoccupation with
topics related to B lacks. Obviously, it is nearly impossible for most
African Americans to hide the fact that they are Black, but in
majority-white environments, many African Americans in the past
tried to "blend in" by making their distinctive racial characteristics
easy to ignore.66 These tendencies have waned.
More African Americans now integrate on their own terms. When
entering a majority-white or multi-race setting, they do not downplay
their racial identity. Quite the contrary, the majority culture has
adopted many elements of African-American culture, most notably in
music, literature, and the visual arts. And African-American culture,
history, and artistic expression have become accepted subjects of study
in U.S. universities. In an undergraduate English class on twentieth
century American literature, a student is as likely to read Zora Neale
Hurston or Toni Morrison as Thomas Pynchon or Philip Roth.
African Americans are not the only adherents of the valuing-our
identities approach. In the past, immigrant groups that could "blend

of the dorms. These dorms were unpopular with most other students. While Blacks
constituted 11 % of the student body, they constituted 24.6% of the residents of these three
dorms. The university eliminated student choice of dorms in response to this perceived self
segregation. See News and Views: Taking Steps to Curtail Black Student Self-Segregation at
Harvard College, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1997, at 14. Cornell, Wesleyan, and
Brown have offered Black theme houses in which almost all residents have been Black. Id.
65. GATES, supra note 62, at 203.
66. Kenji Yoshino offers his own detailed account of this form of assimilation, which he
calls "covering." See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
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in" more easily than B lacks chose to assimilate, viewing their culture
of origin as something to hide or escape.67 But today, even those who
can "blend in" are choosing not to do so, seeing their distinct heritages
as a unique source of pride, rather than shame.68 Immigrant groups,
Native Americans, religious minorities, gays and lesbians, and disabled
persons are all demanding recognition of their distinct perspectives
and cultures, as well as equal status as citizens. In short, as sociologist
Nathan Glazer puts it, "We are all multiculturalists now."69
It is hardly surprising that many African Americans have
abandoned the assimilationist model of integration. Pursuit of
assimilation seems pointless to many, especially as history suggests
that African Americans never will be seen as other than different in
America. And, as the woman from Atlanta says, African Americans of
means can now choose to live as they please "without sacrificing
lifestyle, education, or traditional values."70
So what now? Leaving aside case-specific remedies for past
discrimination and the thorny issue of reparations,71 it appears that
diversity has replaced assimilation as the guiding ideal in the quest for
racial equality. The question is whether the ideal of diversity is
sufficient to secure the gains that have been made in racial equality
since Brown, and whether it is adequate to attend to the needs of

67. Indeed, this is what the melting pot metaphor was about. See supra text
accompanying note 31.
68. See generally MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN
AMERICA (1990).
69. GLAZER, supra note 35. Glazer argues that multiculturalism, understood as ethnic
groups' celebration of their differences at the expense of the melting-pot ideal, is the price
that America is paying for its reluctance to integrate African Americans into American
society. See id. at 120.
70. GATES, supra note 62, at 203.
71. Claims for reparations are broader than case-specific remedies for racial
discrimination. For example, minority persons who are subjected to racial discrimination in
employment have various grounds of redress under existing statutes, such as Title VII. See,
e.g. , Nat'! R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (allowing remedies for a
Black man's claims of hostile work environment); Local No. 93, Int'! Ass'n of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (providing relief, in a class action, to Black and
Hispanic firefighters who challenged the city fire department's failure to promote on the
basis of race); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that a hiring policy
involving a high school diploma requirement had an unlawful disproportionate racial
impact). Proponents of reparations, however, argue that "America owes a debt for the
enslavement and segregation of African Americans," and that, in assessing this debt,
"[t]here are very few meaningful distinctions between the claims presented on behalf of
large classes of African Americans and small groups of identifiable victims of Jim Crow
discrimination." Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations
Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 279, 319 (2003). The article by
Professor Ogletree summarizes the arguments for reparations and responds to critics who
contend that there is no viable cause of action for reparations.
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African Americans who are now suffering as members of society's
underclass. 72
IV. THE D IVERSITY IDEAL
The Supreme Court first credited diversity as a societal goal in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 73 In Bakke, Justice
Powell's plurality opinion noted that "the attainment of a diverse
student body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution
of higher education."74 The reason, Justice Powell explained, is that

[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.
The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body.
....The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation" - so
essential to the quality of higher education - is widely believed to be
promoted by a diverse student body... . [T]he "nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure" to the ideas and mores of
students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.75
Justice Powell presented diversity as an alternative to justifications
for

affirmative

action

that

focused

on

past

discrimination

and

inequality. In other words, in his view, the pursuit of diversity is
independent of claims for redress for past racial discrimination. The
Bakke notion of diversity views exposure to the various perspectives
of our pluralistic nation as essential to the education of our leaders. In
deriving the importance of diversity from the First Amendment value
of "the robust exchange of ideas, '' Justice Powell echoed the classical
liberal notion that exposure to the marketplace of ideas strengthens
democratic decisionmaking and individual self-realization.76
Justice Powell cited Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire77 to support the general proposition that a
university has a First Amendment interest in making its own
judgments, including the selection of its students. The Sweezy decision
reversed the contempt conviction of a university professor who had

72. See generally AN AMERICAN DILEMMA REVISITED: RACE RELATIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD, supra note 8; THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 61.
73. 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
74. Id. at 311-12.
75. Id. at 312-13 (footnote omitted) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967)).
76. This view is often associated with the political philosophy of liberal thinkers such as
John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-71 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978)
(1859).
77. 354 U.S. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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refused to answer the New Hampshire attorney general's questions
regarding the content of his lectures and his knowledge of the Socialist
party.78 In expounding on the importance of academic freedom and
diversity in Bakke, Justice Powell quoted language from Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy opinion, stating:

" 'It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a
university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.' "79
Justice Powell did not indicate that Frankfurter's language was not his
own. Frankfurter was himself quoting another source, the statement of
a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and
the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa.80 The conference
opposed the South African government's proposal to impose racial
apartheid in educational institutions.81
This digression casts a light on Justice Powell's exposition of
"academic freedom." It is plausible to view racial equality as only
incidental to Justice Powell's idea of diversity,82 for he did explicitly
note that diversity embraced more than race and ethnicity:

Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified
medical student with a particular background - whether it be ethnic,
geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged - may bring to a
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that
enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to
render with understanding their vital service to humanity.

78. Id. at 235 (Warren, CJ.).
79. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
80. CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN AND THE UNIV.
OF WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA, at iii, 1 1-12 (1957).
81. Id.
82. For example, Robert Post cites Justice Powell's quotation of the Sweezy language as
evidence that Powell, in contrast to the Grutter majority, "conceptualized diversity as a value
intrinsic to the educational process itself." Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 1 1 7 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59-60 (2003). Although Justice
Frankfurter may not have been thinking of racial discrimination in the United States, it
could not have been too far from his mind. In invoking the statement of the South African
scholars, Justice Frankfurter noted:
It is also perhaps the most poignant because its plea on behalf of continuing the free spirit of
the open universities of South Africa has gone unheeded.
I do not suggest that what New Hampshire has here sanctioned bears any resemblance to the
policy against which this South African remonstrance was directed.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous
student body.83
Nevertheless, it is telling that the language he used to define the ideal
of diversity in terms of academic freedom originated in the South
African resistance to racial apartheid.
We will never know with certainty all of what Justice Powell had in
mind. It is fairly clear, however, that he saw diversity as a way of
justifying affirmative action while avoiding the difficulties allegedly
raised by the search for remedies for past racial discrimination complaints about "preferential treatment" for minorities and the
general confusion and dismay among whites over the scope of
affirmative

action.

Indeed,

citing

the

burdens

placed

on

white

applicants, the Bakke Court struck down the Davis Medical School's
affirmative action plan, explicitly rejecting the argument that the
policy could be justified as a remedy for societal discrimination absent
particular findings of constitutional or statutory violations.84 In holding
that some race-conscious policies might be justified by diversity,
Justice Powell gave some hope to proponents of affirmative action.
But his view was narrow: he valued racial and ethnic diversity only to
the degree that it brought about a diversity of "experiences, outlooks,
and ideas. "85
In the years since Bakke, diversity has gained increasing favor in
American life, particularly with some members of minority groups.
Diversity proponents value differences among groups and take pride
in their distinct group identities. This is not to say that a group's mere
existence gives it entitlements or advantages over other groups.
Rather, the point is that we live in an inclusive society. So each part of
our community must have access to all that makes our society
function. We look to include all, to ensure open access to all, to
provide role models for all, and to enrich mutual efforts by embracing
all perspectives. This approach embodies both the acceptance of the
fact that people are different and a celebration of our plurality of
perspectives as a valued source of knowledge. Consistent with Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion,86 many of today's proponents of diversity
support not only racial diversity, but a diversity of cultures, religions,
languages, abilities, life experiences, and viewpoints.87 This cultural

83. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 307-09.
85. Id. at 3 14.
86. Justice Powell noted: "Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of
factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student
body." Id.
87. See generally GLAZER, supra note 35; DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC
AMERICA (1995) .
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shift in values - away from assimilation and toward diversity - set
the stage for the Court's decision in Grutter.
V.

GRUTTER 'S DIVERSITY AND RACIAL EQUALITY

Grutter establishes diversity as the next milepost on the road to
racial equality. In Grutter, the Supreme Court embraces diversity as a
"compelling interest" sufficient to enable racial preferences in law
school admissions policies to withstand strict scrutiny.88 Grutter affirms
Bakke's commitment to diversity in higher education. But, in so doing,
the Court expands Justice Powell's ideal of educational diversity,
articulating and affirming the essential role that diversity plays in
American society generally:

These benefits [of diversity) are not theoretical but real, as major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure
to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more,
high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States
military assert that, "[b)ased on [their] decades of experience," a "highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps .. . is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principle [sic) mission to provide national security."89
In articulating the importance of diversity to the experiences of
American business and the military, Grutter, unlike Bakke, suggests a
link between diversity and the ongoing quest for racial equality.
Grutter cites Brown to establish the importance of equal educational
opportunities to democratic citizenship:

This Court has long recognized that "education ...is the very foundation
of good citizenship." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74
S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). For this reason, the diffusion of
knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher
education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or
ethnicity.... Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one
Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.90
The Court concludes that diversity permits the law school to maintain
a path to leadership that is visibly open to all races and ethnicities.91
Grutter also departs from Bakke's implication that racial diversity
can approximate the diversity of perspectives in American society. For
the Grutter majority, diversity is a compelling reason to maintain race
conscious policies not because of a belief that different races possess

88. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
89. Id. at 2340 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
90.

Id. at 2340-41.

91. Id. at 2341.
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identifiably distinct perspectives, but because having a critical mass of
students from different groups helps break down expectations that
often are based on racial stereotypes.

The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on "any belief
that minority students always (or even consistently) express some
characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue." Brief for Respondent
Bollinger et al. 30. To the contrary, diminishing the force of such
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one
that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority
students.92
When non-Black students interact with more than one African
American student, it is less likely that the views and characteristics of
a single African American will be assumed to be representative of the
entire race. The Court recognizes that diversity not only illuminates
the differences between groups, but also the variety of perspectives
within any single group. Grutter is consistent with Bakke, however, in
rejecting affirmative action programs that entail racial quotas93 or fail
to

provide

for

"individualized

consideration"

of

competing

applications. 94
The Grutter majority's suggestion of a time limit on the use of race
to achieve diversity is somewhat perplexing. If diversity is a good
thing, then it will remain so for as long as there are distinct groups in
society. Yet, the majority opinion notes: "We expect that 25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today."95 This time limit harkens back to
the implication in Brown that integration through assimilation would
eventually cure problems emanating from racial bias. As noted earlier,
this is

a doubtful proposition.

But even if integration through

assimilation were possible, the ideal of diversity implicitly challenges
the desirability of a "blended" society, and the pursuit of diversity
undermines the process of assimilation. Diversity involves awareness,

92. Id.
93. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke rules out a racial quota or set-aside, in which race
is the sole fact of eligibility for certain places in a class. 438 U.S. at 307.
94. In the companion case to Grutter, the Supreme Court rejected Michigan's use of
race in its undergraduate admissions policy, in part, because the program did not involve
"individualized consideration" of applications, as contemplated by Bakke:
We find that the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or one
fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented
minority" applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the
interest in educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their program. . . . [T]he
(University's] automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making "the factor of
race . . . decisive" for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority
applicant.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427-28 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
95. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
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if not celebration, of relevant differences, including different racial
identities. Thus, consciousness of race is an unavoidable part of the
process of achieving diversity and the equality it is intended to foster.
In any event, Grutter situates diversity in the world that we have
inherited, and this means tackling racial inequality. Thus, it is highly
plausible that Grutter uses diversity as a proxy for redress against past
racial discrimination.96 And if the worst effects of racial bigotry are not
cured in 25 years, the time limit can be extended.
Grutter, like Brown, is a major symbolic victory for proponents of
racial equality: It makes it clear that African Americans must have a
meaningful place in American society, and that we are not yet there. I
think that a majority of the Court believed that renouncing the
Michigan plan might trample the ideal of racial equality. They
believed that there is still a need to take firm steps to achieve racial
equality, whether through diversity programs or otherwise.
VI. MOVING FORWARD
Diversity gives new content to the principles of equal opportunity
and integration that underlie Brown. The affirmation of diversity in
connection with racial equality should spur Americans to find cures
for old wounds and, also, take prophylactic steps to ensure that the
gains that we have seen in the past 50 years are not lost to
shortsightedness in the future.
A.

The Black Underclass

First, there is no doubt that, because of the advances in racial
equality since Brown, many African Americans are relatively well off.
Unfortunately, this is only part of the picture. The present facts
concerning the Black underclass are truly depressing. Rates of
poverty, unemployment, and incarceration remain dramatically higher
among African Americans than among other groups in America
today. As the national poverty rate grew to 12. 1 % in 2002, the poverty
rate for Blacks was 24.1 %, as compared to 8% for non-Hispanic

96. Robert Post recently made a similar point in the Harvard Law Review Foreword,
supra note 82. Post suggests that the Grutter Court's endorsement of diversity was
qualitatively different from Justice Powell's exposition in Bakke. Id. According to Post,
Justice Powell's diversity rationale bore no relation to the actual reasons why affirmative
action became prominent in American higher education, reasons based "almost entirely on
the felt need to remedy deep social dislocations associated with race." Id. at 63. The Grutter
Court "far more accurately identifies these reasons." Id. at 63-64. Post views Grutter's
account of diversity, which links it to the need to make the "path to leadership . . . visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity," id. at 61 (quoting
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341), as evidence that "Grutter endorses the practice of affirmative
action for university admissions in terms that closely correspond to the reasons that actually
sustain the practice," id. at 65.
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whites.97 In a March 2004 survey, the national unemployment rate was
5.7%, with 10.2% of Blacks unemployed, as compared to 5.1 % of
whites.98 The comparison of incarceration rates is even more
astounding: 10.4 % of B lack men ages 25-29 are incarcerated, as
compared to 1.2 % of white men in the same age group. 99
Many poor Black people live in urban areas that are largely
segregated, though not by law.100 Conditions are truly terrible in the
worst of these inner-city neighborhoods. Chicago's Robert Taylor
Homes, which was the largest public housing development in the
country before being torn down by the City,101 is a good example: one
in five Black men in their twenties was in jail, in prison, or on parole;
69 % of Black children were raised in single-parent households; the
average life span of an African-American man was fifty-nine years;
and only 45 % of Black adults were working in any given week.102
The causes of the Black underclass are both "external" (the legacy
of slavery, segregation, discrimination, poor systems of public
education, and failed economic policy) and "internal" (the failure of
some African Americans to take needed personal steps to avoid drugs,
crime, unplanned pregnancies, and other self-destructive behavior that
worsens their plight).1 03 And, as Orlando Patterson notes, these causes
are linked:

97. BERNADETIE D. PROCTOR & JOSEPH DALAKER, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2002, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf.
98. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation: March 2004, at 1 (Apr. 2,
2004), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_04022004.pdf.
99. Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2002, Bureau of Justice Statistics
Bulletin, July 2003, at 9, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p02.pdf.
100. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (arguing that
residential segregation is the main cause of Black poverty).
101. On its website, the Chicago Housing Authority notes:
Robert Taylor was considered the largest public housing development in the world when it
was completed in 1962. With more than 4,300 units, this massive development occupied a
two-mile long stretch of south State Street. The apartments were arrayed in a linear series of
28 16-story high-rises, which formed a kind of concrete curtain for traffic passing by on the
nearby Dan Ryan Expressway. Most of these high-rises have been demolished, and the
remaining buildings will be closed by 2005. By containing a large low-income population on
an isolated site, the Robert Taylor property became a national symbol for the errant
philosophy of post-war public housing.
CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, ROBERT TAYLOR HOMES: HISTORY (2003), at http://
thecha.org/housingdev/robert_taylor.html.
102. GATES, supra note 62, at 335.
103. ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN
Two AMERICAN CENTURIES, at viii (1998) [hereinafter PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD].
See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND
RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "RACIAL" CRISIS (1997) (critiquing liberals for focusing too
much on external factors, and critiquing conservatives for focusing too much on internal
factors).

March 2004)

From Brown to Grutter

969

The internal and external problems of the group are inextricably linked.
For the purposes of analysis, we often focus on one or the other area and
level of the causal net, but when people insist, as conservatives are wont
to do, that only the proximate internal cultural and behavior factors are
important ("So stop whining and pull up your socks, man!"), or as
liberals and mechanistic radicals are inclined to do, that only the prox
imate external factors are worth considering ("Stop blaming the victim,
racist!"), they are playing tiresome and obfuscating ideological games.104
Obviously, Grutter does not purport to address the problems of the
Black underclass. Indeed, the ideal of diversity, as it is discussed in
Grutter, is largely irrelevant to the significant number of African
Americans who now suffer the worst effects of poverty, poor housing,
crime-infested neighborhoods, unemployment, and low quality public
education. For many such individuals, higher education is a distant
dream. Although the B lack-underclass issue is beyond the scope of
this essay, it is not out of my thoughts. The subject is complicated and
controversial, and, frankly, it raises questions that cannot be fully
addressed here. But it would be irresponsible to applaud some of the
advances in racial equality that we have seen over the past 50 years
without acknowledging that the enormous class disparity affecting
African Americans is dramatically worse than the class disparities
affecting other groups in society.105 This reflects an enduring and
deeply troubling form of racial inequality that must be addressed in
the years ahead.
B.

Reevaluating Merit

Second, the acknowledgments in Bakke and Grutter that diversity
enhances educational quality caution against the use of mere numbers
to measure merit. I am not suggesting that diversity points should
replace test scores in evaluating students. But the diversity debate
should remind us that there is a limit to what numbers can forecast
about the things we value in people and education.

104. ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD, supra note 103, at ix.
105. As noted earlier, the poverty rate for African Americans, at 24.1 %, is three times
greater than that for whites. See PROCTOR & DALAKER, supra note 97. The U.S. Census
Bureau's statistics, dividing the population into fifths by income, show that for whites, the
smallest raw number of persons occupy the lowest fifth. The raw numbers increase
incrementally from one fifth to the next, with the largest raw number of whites in the highest
fifth. For Blacks, the opposite is true. The largest raw number of Blacks occupy the lowest
fifth, and the smallest raw number occupy the highest fifth. These figures show that there are
relatively larger proportions of the white population in the middle, between the highest and
lowest fifths, as compared to the Black population. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, 2003 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT, TABLE HINC·
05, at http://ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/032003/hhinc/new05_000.htm (Nov. 13, 2003). Thus,
one can infer that the income gap between rich and poor African Americans is greater than
the gap between rich and poor whites.
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Depending on what one is assessing, numbers can predict a lot or
almost nothing. Yet, they are beguiling because they tend to carry a
comforting aura of objectivity. In fact, the use of numbers does
provide some objective measure of merit, one that was important to
the opening up of elite universities in the United States. As Nicholas
Lemann has documented, standardized tests enabled universities like
Harvard to develop admissions policies that gave greater weight to
ability and less to attendance at elite prep schools, hereditary wealth,
and privilege.106 Standardized tests admittedly played an important
role in transforming higher education from a bastion of aristocracy to
a major vehicle of upward mobility in America.
However, in the name of meritocracy, we now tend to attribute too
much to numbers. We find it easier to rely on standardized tests than
to develop fuller, fairer measures of potential and talent. Thus, for
example, too many people readily assume that the difference of a few
points on a standardized test says something meaningful about the
relative merits of two law school applicants, even when both have
achieved scores that demonstrate that they are up to the same
educational challenge. Although standardized test scores are useful for
determining whether a student possesses the skills necessary to enter a
competitive learning environment, they do not assist in drawing
meaningful distinctions between qualified individuals. Once a score
establishes that an individual is in the zone of qualified candidates,
other

measures

of

potential,

such

as

writing,

references,

and

interviews, should carry real weight in the selection process. These
measures give us a fuller picture of promising students.
Reliance

on

numbers,

particularly

on

standardized

tests,

is

troubling for another reason. Despite the origin of standardized
testing in the pursuit of equal opportunity, the use of numbers to
achieve meritocracy may now perpetuate, rather than undermine, the
inheritance of class privilege. As some scholars have documented, the
correlation between test scores and indicators of socioeconomic status
is greater than the correlation between test scores and future academic
and professional performance.107 A recent study shows that even
though many of the minority students admitted to the University of
Michigan Law School from 1970 to 1996 had lower undergraduate

106. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN MERITOCRACY 7-9, 65 (1999).
107. See Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 149 (2003); see also Susan Sturm &
Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 953, 988 (1996) (noting that "[t]he correlation between family income and SAT is
nearly four times larger than the incremental improvement in prediction offered by the SAT
used in conjunction with high school grades"); Lempert et al., supra note 50, at 490 ("LSAT
and [undergraduate] GPA, which in many law schools are the most prominent admissions
screens, have almost nothing to do with our measures of achievement after law school. . . . ").
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GPAs and LSAT scores than their white counterparts, they have not
enjoyed less success in the legal profession. Whether measured by
income,

self-reported

satisfaction,

or

public

service,

minority

graduates enjoy professional success in equal or greater measure than
their

white

peers.108

Moreover,

an

entire

industry

devoted

to

preparation for standardized tests has shown that standardized tests
are manipulable.109 An expensive test-prep course is likely to raise a
student's score and, as competition increases for places in elite
colleges and professional schools, a few points can make the difference
between acceptance and rejection. But those few points are not a good
basis for comparing the potential of qualified, competitive candidates.
C.

Expansion of Mentoring and Networking Opportunities

Third, as we emphasize nonnumerical human factors, such as
mentors' opinions, in comparing the academic and professional merits
of qualified individuals, we need to be mindful of the effects of racial
dynamics

on

the

quantity,

quality,

and

variety

of

mentoring

relationships available to young African Americans. Mentoring and
networking both significantly determine an individual's opportunities
for success in school and employment.
My own educational and professional experiences are illuminating.
When I was an undergraduate at Cornell, the late Professor Jean
McKelvey, a preeminent teacher in the School of Industrial and Labor
Relations and nationally acclaimed labor arbitrator, took me under
her wing and pushed me hard to succeed. She not only taught me,
encouraged me, and made me believe in myself while I was at Cornell,
she also opened doors for me years later when I entered the
arbitration profession.
When I was nearing graduation from Cornell, I could not decide
whether to enter the military, go into the ministry, or do graduate
work in academic administration. The late Professor Kurt Hanslowe, a
prominent labor law professor who taught in both the undergraduate
and law schools at Cornell, sat me down and explained to me why I
should go to law school. He then helped me to decide where to apply,
served as a reference (which no doubt enhanced my prospects with
several outstanding law schools), and advised me on how to assess the
schools that admitted me.
At Michigan Law School, I had the good fortune to serve as a
research assistant for the late Professor Russell Smith, one of the top
labor law scholars in the country. He was a wonderful mentor who, as
I have already noted, used his immense influence to ensure my

108. See Lempert et al., supra note 50, at 395.
109. See Guinier, supra note 107, at 148.
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placement at an outstanding law firm upon graduation from law
school.
My good fortune continued when I entered law practice. My
mentor at the law firm was the managing partner. He took me very
seriously and made it clear from day one that, although some of the
partners doubted that a B lack man could succeed as a labor law
attorney for major corporations, he expected success. And he was true
to his word. On one occasion, I had an uncomfortable exchange with a
racist client. As a young associate, I was unsure how to handle the
situation. I went to my mentor, explained the problem, and said that I
did not want to continue serving the client. After listening to me, he
said: "Oh, those folks are bad ! " He then made it clear that I had two
options: I could either continue with the client, in which case he would
set matters straight, or I could drop the assignment and take some
other work in its place. I opted for the latter. My mentor then
reassigned the racist client to another young associate and gave me
several new clients with whom to work. Anyone with any sensitivity
will immediately understand how much my mentor's actions buoyed
my spirits and confidence - he blamed the client, not me, for the
breakdown in our relationship, and he gave me more and better work
to replace the work that he reassigned. Later, when I received an offer
to join the faculty at Michigan, I was reluctant to leave law pradce.
My mentor set me straight, telling me: "You would be crazy not to try
law teaching. Accept the offer; if you do not like it, you will have a
partnership waiting for you at the firm."
Finally, when I was being considered for the bench, a number of
colleagues in the legal academic community played a huge role in
promoting my candidacy for a position on the D .C. Circuit. And, after
it was publicly announced that I was a serious candidate, William T.
Coleman, Jr., the former Secretary of Transportation and one of the
great lawyers in America, gave me the benefit of his wisdom, counsel,
and friendship, which enabled me to find my way in Washington, D.C.,
during the appointment and confirmation processes.
My mentors were both white and African American, and they
were

absolutely

essential

to

my

professional

development

and

accomplishments. Not only did they provide connections and advocate
on my behalf at crucial moments in my young adult life, but, more
important, they explained the system to me, nurtured me, and gave me
the confidence to take on and complete challenging work.
The value of mentoring and networking is so obvious that it hardly
warrants mention. Unfortunately, even to this date, African
Americans do not benefit from mentoring and networking to the same
degree as their non-Black peers. There are strong networks within
African-American communities - through Black student associations,
professional associations, fraternities, sororities, churches, and
political organizations, as well as informal social interactions - but
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there are not enough cross-racial networking opportunities for African
Americans. This situation exists, in part, because of the state of race
relations, which necessarily affects the social dynamics through which
people find and become mentors. When I was in law school and in law
practice, I did not have African-American mentors, because there
were no Black professors on the faculty and no other minority
attorneys in the law firm. As African Americans have joined law
school faculties, law firms, and other professional enterprises, many
have taken affirmative steps to counsel young African Americans who
are on their way up. Nowadays, perhaps as a result of having available
some African-American role models, it is not uncommon for Black
students to seek out only African Americans for guidance. Likewise, it
is not uncommon for many persons who are not African American to
assume that the sole responsibility for mentoring young African
Americans rests with senior members of the race.11° Some whites
benignly assume that their advice would not be welcome by young
African Americans, especially when there are older African
Americans available. More blameworthy are those who are reluctant
to mentor African Americans, because of preconceived, unverified
views of their qualifications.111 Such misguided perceptions invariably
reinforce the suspicions of some young African Americans that those
professors and employers have no real interest in seeing them
succeed.112
There is fault on both sides. Too many young African Americans
assume the worst and thus fail to seek out non-Black mentors. And
too many would-be mentors can be blind to their failure to treat all of
their charges the same, without regard to race. All too often, foibles
that are typical of any student or young employee are taken as a sign
of a person's incompetence when committed by an African American.

110. See Guinier, supra note 107, at 118-19 (noting that teaching and learning gaps
disable professors from reaching out to mentor students of color). Psychological studies have
noted the difficulties nonrninority mentors face in providing feedback to students of color.
See, e.g. , Geoffrey L. Cohen & Claude M. Steele, A Barrier of Mistrust: How Negative
Stereotypes Affect Cross-Race Mentoring, in IMPROVING ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT:
IMPACT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS ON EDUCATION 305 (Joshua Aronson ed., 2002);
David A. Thomas, Racial Dynamics in Cross-race Developmental Relationships, 38 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 169, 189-90 (1993).
111. See David B. Wilkins, Rollin ' on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality
Paradox, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 527, 542-43 (2000).
112. A recent survey of undergraduates at the University of Michigan established that
46% of African-American seniors "feel that they have experienced some difficulty in 'being
taken seriously academically - having professors think I am capable of doing quality
work.' " JOHN MATLOCK ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, THE MICHIGAN STUDENT
STUDY: STUDENTS' EXPECTATIONS OF AND EXPERIENCES WITH RACIALiETHNIC
DIVERSITY 12 (2002), available at http://www.umich.edu/-oami/mss/research/index.htm. In
contrast, only 21 % of white and 30% of Asian-American and Latino students have
experienced this difficulty. Id.
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Serious consequences flow from these distortions. They limit the
growth, development, and progress of individuals on both sides of
potential mentoring relationships by causing them to withdraw from
fruitful interactions with people different from themselves. They limit
opportunities for truly worthy candidates. Occasionally, they may
cause some African Americans to flounder unnecessarily due to
feelings of insecurity. It is time for us to advance beyond these
difficulties. People of all races in leadership positions need to make a
greater effort to mentor students and employees different from
themselves, and young African Americans need to be bolder and more
broadminded in selecting their mentors and role models.

D.

Focus on Equal Opportunity in Primary and Secondary Education

Fourth, we should take Grutter's suggestion of a 25-year limit on
the use of race to achieve diversity as a prod to achieve meaningful
improvement

in

the

many

troubled

inner-city

public

schools

throughout the country. History has shown that affirmative action in
higher education is inadequate to solve some of the greatest barriers
to

racial

equality, which include the problems

of the

African

American underclass. The integration of more advantaged African
Americans in institutions of higher education has not improved the lot
of the least advantaged African Americans, most of whom do not
attend quality elementary and secondary schools. While giving a nod
to the ideal of equality embodied in Brown, Grutter provides no relief
for the unsolved and arguably intractable problem that was the subject
of Brown: inequality in elementary and secondary public education.
No one seriously disputes that inner-city public education is
generally

poor.113 And sociologists have noted that, since

1986,

segregation in public schools has been rising.114 Minority schools are
highly correlated with high-poverty schools, which are also associated
with low parental involvement, lack of resources, fewer experienced
and credentialed teachers, and 'higher teacher turnover, all of which
exacerbate education inequality for minority students.115 More than
half the Black students attending urban public schools fail to reach
national proficiency standards on standardized tests in fourth and

1 13. See, e.g. , 0RFIELD & LEE, supra note 7, at 20-21; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED 57-58 (1987).
114. See, e.g., 0RFIELD & LEE, supra note 7; ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE,
RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 5
(2002) (analyzing public school enrollment data collected by the U.S. Department of
Education to conclude that since 1986, Black and Latino students have become more racially
segregated from whites in almost every district examined).
1 15. FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 1 14, at 5.
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eighth grades,116 and dropout rates in the nation's largest urban school
districts are twice the national average.117
There are no obvious legal solutions emanating from Brown,
affirmative action, or Grutter, for the grossly unequal educational
opportunities in primary and secondary schools available to the Black
underclass. To the degree that the problems of inner-city schools are
caused by poverty, federal constitutional law does not offer an obvious
remedy. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,118
the Supreme Court held that school funding schemes based on
property taxes that disadvantage the poor did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Holding that the poor do not constitute a suspect
class, 119 and that education is not a fundamental constitutional right, 120
the Court declined to strike down policies disadvantaging the poor in
public education. Because most of the legal solutions that purport to
address the problems of primary and secondary schools cannot be
characterized as remedies for equal protection violations of the sort
Brown,

they

tend

scheme
" desegregation. " 1 21

than

the

identified

by

constitutional

to

carry

remedies

less
of

in

our

"integration"

weight

and

Furthermore, even assuming that integration is the solution to the
problems of our urban public schools, integration is not a viable
option in many urban school districts. The simple truth is that, in many
urban areas, relatively few white students attend racially integrated
public
schools. 1 22 Public schools in
major cities
are now

1 16. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, THE NATION'S REPORT CARD:
TRIAL URBAN DISTRICT ASSESSMENT, MATHEMATICS HIGHLIGHTS 2003, at 9-10
(2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/dst2003/2004458.pdf; NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, THE NATION'S REPORT CARD: TRIAL URBAN
DISTRICT ASSESSMENT, READING HIGHLIGHTS 2003, at 9-10 (2003), available at http://
nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/dst2003/2004459.pdf.
1 17. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 274-75 (1999).
118. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
1 19. Id. at 28.
120. Id. at 35.
121. It should be noted, however, that, in the aftermath of Rodriguez, state courts have
been the site of extensive litigation, based on state constitutional theories, over the equity
and adequacy of school funding. In some states, litigants have been successful in obtaining
legal remedies for inequitable or inadequate school funding. These cases have generally
been litigated on the basis of state equal protection clauses (arguing that education is a
fundamental right under the state constitution) or state education clauses, which typically
impose an obligation on the state that some courts have held was not being met. See, e.g.,
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d
893 (N.Y. 2003).
122. In Washington, D.C., for example, Black students constitute 84.6% of students
enrolled in the largest central-city school district. In Detroit, Black students constitute 91 %
of the largest central-city school district. In Cleveland's largest central-city district, Black
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overwhelmingly populated by minority students, whereas 30 years ago,
many urban school districts had white maj orities.123 In the decades
following Brown, more affluent white families moved to the
suburbs, 124 where public schools are predominantly attended by whites
and Asians.125 The proliferation of private schools has also provided
affluent urban families with an alternative to public schools. Through
the use of vouchers, some states have attempted to offer poor children
this same option. Although the Supreme Court recently upheld the
voucher program in Cleveland, 126 such programs still raise state
constitutional issues127 and policy debates.128 It is thus unclear whether
the voucher solution is a fully effective or politically salable answer to
the problems of inner-city primary and secondary schools.
Even desegregation remedies that seek to avoid city boundaries
have been found legally wanting.129 Mandatory busing has had only
limited success, and it remains controversial.130 And recent efforts to

students constitute 71.3% of enrolled students. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 54
(2003).
123. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 122, at 56-57.
124. WILSON, supra note 1 13, at 136.
125. The majority of students in most of the largest suburban school districts nationwide
are white. However, there are exceptions, such as Prince George's County, Maryland, and
DeKalb County, Georgia. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 122, at 62-63.
126. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
127. The principal constitutional problems involve state religion clauses, which typically
have different wording and history and often are interpreted more broadly than the federal
First Amendment, and other provisions drawn from state education clauses, which restrict
legislative power. See, e.g., Owens v. Colorado Cong. of Parents, Teachers and Students, No.
03SA364, 2004 WL 1432407 (Colo. June 28, 2004) (striking down voucher program under a
provision of the Colorado Constitution providing for local control of education); Holmes v.
Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002) (striking down voucher
program under Florida's prohibition of public funding "in aid of' sectarian institutions),
appeal docketed, No. 1D02-3160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't
of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the use of vouchers at sectarian schools
would violate state constitutional prohibition on compelled support of religion).
128. One of the biggest issues is whether vouchers actually improve the achievement of
students who receive them. The research to date is inconclusive. Paul E. Peterson has argued
that vouchers improve Black children's educational performance. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL
& PAUL E. PETERSON, THE EDUCATION GAP: VOUCHERS AND URBAN SCHOOLS (2002).
Others disagree. See, e.g. , ALEX MOLNAR, VOUCHERS, CLASS SIZE REDUCTION, AND
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE (2000). Another important issue is
whether voucher programs undermine the public schools, which continue to educate most
minority and inner-city children, by draining off resources and political support and making
it impossible to achieve any real reform.
129. See, e.g. , Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (striking down cross-district
busing in the Detroit area because the suburban jurisdictions had no legal responsibility for
the previous segregation in Detroit).
130. See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE
LAW 222-23 (1995); see also Alfred A. Lindseth, Legal Issues Related to School
Funding/Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 20,
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work around the problem have fared no better. In one case, a federal
district court in Missouri attempted to address "white flight " by
establishing a program allowing residents of suburban school districts
to attend urban schools voluntarily. To attract white students who
would otherwise attend suburban or private schools to the urban
school district, the district court ordered the conversion of inner-city
schools into magnet schools.131 The Supreme Court struck down that
plan in Missouri v. Jenkins, holding that the district court had
exceeded what was necessary for the state to remedy the injuries of
prior de jure segregation.132
Proponents of reform appear to be stuck "between a rock and a
hard place" in searching for legal remedies to address the problems of
our inner-city public schools. Brown has not led to equal educational
opportunity for children whose only educational options are public
schools in poor urban districts, and Grutter offers little hope for a use
ful legal remedy to cure the problem. Strong public policy initiatives
will be the answer, if society can find the will to face the issue.
E.

Diversity: A New Model of Integration?

Finally, we should reflect broadly on the ideal of diversity, beyond
the conceptualizations that we have inherited from Bakke and Grutter.
Diversity, understood through the valuing-our-identities approach, has
the potential to reinvigorate the ideal of integration. Although the
journey from assimilation to diversity has been long, the ideal of
integration has not been lost along the way. Between Brown and the
present, the valuing-our-identities ethos has reshaped the ideal of
integration. It has empowered many African Americans to be who
they want to be, without shame or apology. This should enhance
interaction across groups and cultures - allowing all people to benefit
from the different experiences of others. These different experiences
do not always generate predictably distinct ideas, viewpoints, or
perspectives. And they need not in order to be valuable. The
desirability of different experiences and perspectives is their power to
cast light on various nuances of human existence. It is difficult to
predict the content of these perspectives or to quantify and describe
their educational value with precision in advance. Nonetheless, my

at 47 (noting opposition of white parents to mandatory busing); Christine H. Rossell,
A ttitudes on Race and Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 20, at 301 (noting that most Black parents do not support mandatory busing);
Christine H. Rossell, The Effectiveness of Desegregation Plans, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 20, at 93 (noting increase in white flight in reaction to
mandatory busing).
131. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 92-93 (1995).
132. Id. at 101-02.
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backgrounds are different from one's own.133 This is a broadly
conceived diversity ideal that emphasizes not only difference, but,
more important, dialogue. That is why it is ultimately an integrationist
notion.
According to this new ideal of integration, persons who are
different learn from one another by engaging in a dialogue made
possible by mutual respect. Distinct identities confer dignity, not
shame. " Blending into" the majority culture is not a condition of
conversation. Nor is commonality of background a necessary predicate
to community. In short, integration does not require assimilation, but
can be born of a respectful and open exchange of ideas and opinions.
A broadly conceived diversity model of integration is here to stay,
not only to visit for 25 years. As Justice Powell noted in Bakke,
ethnicity and race need not forever remain the primary elements of
diversity. Whether they do will be affected by the progress made in
eradicating the remnants of racial bigotry. And ironically, as the
Grutter majority recognized, the race-conscious pursuit of diversity
may do the most to diminish the salience of race to the diversity ideal
itself. With the entry of more African Americans into mixed-race
environments, more and more non-Blacks will come to understand
that there is no single African-American perspective. It will become
clear that diversity within a group can be as rich and complex as
diversity between groups.
Fifty years after Brown, it is apparent that the rejection of
"separate but equal" was not enough to fully realize the ideal of
integration. Nor were the strategies of assimilation or affirmative
action. We can only hope that diversity, broadly conceived, will give
the pursuit of integration new integrity and vitality in the years
to come.

133. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1666-70 (2003); Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 325, 329-30 (2002).

